







Abstract:  The essay explores some recent controversies in British music 
copyright through the evolving technologies used to perform or play music in the 
courtroom. While the conceptual tension between cases has caused doctrinal anxiety 
about the effect of popular music in copyright, the essay contends that the recent 
stream of music copyright cases can be considered from a historical perspective, 
taking into account the tools, materials and experts as they featured in court. In doing 
so, the essay connects a history of legal expertise to the emergence of new 
technologies while arguing that legal knowledge about music copyright was, in fact, 
stabilised in the courtroom.  
 




In early 1987, almost a quarter of a century after his first appearance as an expert 
witness in a music copyright trial, Geoffrey Bush was called again to the stand. The 
case involved what has become an increasingly familiar copyright drama: the alleged 
infringement of a famous pop song – in this case, Vangelis’ “Chariots of Fire”. With a 
professional reputation built on developing strategies against copyright infringement 
claims, it was hardly surprising to see Bush deployed by the defence, giving evidence 
for one of the co-defendants. Indeed, the aural controversies at issue resembled those 
of previous landmark cases in which he had already intervened: a degree of musical 
similarity between songs; difficulty in establishing derivation; and claims of 
subconscious copying (Roberton v Lewis [1976]; Francis, Day & Hunter v Bron 
[1963]; Ledrut v Meek [1968]).  However, in retrospect, there was one crucial 
difference that made this case historically significant, and which would have a then-
unknown impact on the future of music copyright. In previous cases of this kind, the 
collaborative relationship between experts, clerks and solicitors endured after the 
dispute (Bellido, 2013). However, this time the defence team included a young 
apprentice who had stumbled upon the case ‘by mistake’, but who felt so drawn to the 
copyright world that he would continue to work in, and subtly influence, this realm 




The appointment of this young apprentice eventually led to the development of 
forensic musicology as an area relevant to British copyright, and the apprentice 
eventually became one of the main forensic experts in British music copyright in the 
late twentieth century (Bently, 2009). His name was Guy Protheroe, a composer and 
conductor who, like Bush, had studied at Oxford and later worked for the BBC 
(Foreman, 1998; Miller, 2001: 658-659; Protheroe, 2013). And like Bush, he had just 
been appointed as an expert witness for the defendants. However, unlike Bush, he was 
a complete novice, not having any previous experience in music copyright litigation. 
A few years later, when he looked back on the case he considered it a rite of passage 
of sorts, describing it as a true ‘baptism of fire’ (Protheroe, 1994).  
 
By describing his trajectory as an expert witness, the essay focuses not only on the 
contingent ways in which expertise is established but also on the different forensic 
practices developed by musicologists in order to materialise the intangible in the 
courtroom. In particular, it raises questions about the impact of these practices on the 
way music was understood in legal terms, and how this, in turn, affected the 
evaluation of copyright issues such as the nature of musical authorship, the 
requirement of fixation and the definition of copying. In doing so, the essay connects 
a history of expertise with the emergence of technological artefacts, arguing that 
music copyright depended on a series of practices that became stabilised in the 
courtroom, and in turn, that music copyright concepts have been shaped by these 
practices. This account shows music copyright as a contingent product of the complex 
interaction between technology, music expertise and legal knowledge. Although the 
literature on copyright has been preoccupied with the impact of media technologies, it 
has not been so prolific in tracing the innovative use of media in juridical processes of 
producing, ordering and assessing evidence in copyright disputes. By highlighting the 
elusive ways in which new audio media and musicological expertise momentarily 
converged, the essay contends that legal distinctions shape, and are simultaneously 
shaped by, the material ways in which the intangible musical work is constructed and 





The introduction of audio guides 
 
 
When the experts for the defence first met at the Vangelis studio in Marble Arch, 
London, in order to prepare the case before it went to court, Protheroe quickly realised 
an important feature of this case. It was not only that he was working with a musical 
expert; it was that Bush had truly become a  ‘copyright’ expert, someone who had 
capitalised on his previous litigation experiences and used them to assist subsequent 
clients. At the initial meeting, Bush explained one of the primary defensive tactics he 
had learned previously, which the two experts decided to try in this case: the 
preliminary recognition of a common ground of audible similarities between the 
songs (Brown, 1987: 245; Griffin, 1997: 47; Bell: 1987). Deliberately admitting a 
degree of resemblance between the songs enabled Bush and Protheroe to establish a 
musical frame from which a counter-claim could be launched.2 More specifically, 
such a frame of reference gave the defendants the opportunity to demonstrate musical 
influences and coincidences that could explain why different songs might sound 
similar. In this case, for instance, Bush found musical equivalences between the songs 
that, he argued, were from a source ‘sufficiently common to rank as a cliché’, and as a 
result, not a copyright infringement.3 The similarity concentrated on a sequence of 
four notes that were defined in the proceedings as the ‘turn’ (EMI Music Publishing 
Ltd v Papathanasiou [1993] at 310). 
 
 
The subsequent expert report that Protheroe produced for the case reflected Bush’s 
advice and past techniques. He transcribed the songs for piano, and prepared 
examples of the shared melodic fragments to be listened to ‘at the same pitch’.4 
However, Protheroe also introduced other innovative evidential strategies to support 
Vangelis’ defence. Indeed, acknowledging the common assumption of music 
copyright – that ‘music is not seen, but heard’ (Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria, 1980: 20) 
– he thought that there was no better way of distinguishing aural qualities than by 
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assembling an audio guide. He put together two tapes of musical examples to assist 
the judge in the rather tiresome task of reading a pile of expert reports. The songs 
were interposed with Protheroe’s interjections, in which he indicated the fragments 
that deserved special aural attention. As a result, two very specific sound recordings 
became a new vehicle—to give the judge immediate access to the songs and, more 
importantly, to the expert’s opinion of them. The tapes, quite simply, facilitated a 
different approach to the material, and offered an innovation beyond the previous 
musical copyright cases that had consolidated the then-typical ways of demonstrating 
the existence or absence of infringement (Roberton v Lewis [1976]; Francis, Day & 
Hunter v Bron [1963]). The relevant musical compositions were played in court, and 
given to the judge, along with Protheroe’s supplementary audio guides. Rather than 
merely replaying performances in the courtroom, the tapes, accompanied by an 
expert’s explanation, produced a different kind of relationship between the judge and 
the material under consideration. What is striking about this practice is not only how 
the case drew on the audio technologies of the time, but how these technologies 
affected the material conditions and listening experience fundamental to the outcome 
of the case. Indeed, if we read the law report carefully, we find several passages in 
which the judge, Whitford J., voices his appreciation of the benefits of the technology 
submitted to him; the cassette, he said, ‘made it possible for me to listen to the works 
again’ (EMI v Papathanasiou [1993] at 310). However, the law report does not 
mention the infrastructure necessary for him to listen again, to pause and to rewind: a 
portable device – a Sony Walkman – which enabled the evidence provided by the 







Figure 1. Cassette Tapes (Vangelis) 
Courtesy of Guy Protheroe 
 
 
The audio guide and its enabling technology provided an immediate evidential link 
between the oral and the written, enhancing the relationship between the different 
forms of evidence. In this way, the tapes directed the judge to specific musical 
fragments and, in so doing, connected the music previously recorded at the studio 
with his report, supporting the arguments made by the co-defendants’ experts like 
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Geoffrey Bush. The defensive strategy was even seen in the sequence by which the 
songs were linked and juxtaposed with other melodic phrases. In other words, the 
structure of the recorded material reinforced the overlap between the litigated music 
and non-copyright sources. The connection with common sources not protected by 
copyright strengthened the defence’s argument that there was no copyright 
infringement.  
 
More importantly, such a specific and material use of evidence affected the mode in 
which the questions of the case were to be considered. Firstly, the audio guide and its 
associated technology subverted the emphasis on copyright evidence, from the usual 
reliance on visual testimony to an increasing reliance on aural testimony, In other 
words, as a forensic tool, the tapes made it possible to listen to the evidence, both in 
the courtroom and beyond. Furthermore, if the law of evidence, as some scholars have 
suggested, tends to privilege sight over the other senses (Haldar 1991; Bently, 1996), 
then the immediate contact with the aural in this case elicited a rather different 
relationship between the senses. Indeed, it transformed the fleeting (and performative) 
character of giving evidence in court into a more careful, affective process of 
compiling a tape. It also transformed the process of listening to and reading the 
evidence to a perpetual possibility of rewinding, and re-listening, to a tape. Secondly, 
the tapes themselves established a sequential and ordered way of listening through 
which the judge could be guided. Not only did the tapes contain more playing time 
than typical gramophone records, but they could be edited to emphasise exactly the 
bits of music that the defence wanted the judge to hear. The combination of curated 










The British Academy of Experts  
Accreditation and Standardisation 
 
The aural evidence achieved its aim; the judge, Whitford J., declared that if there was 
any aural resemblance, ‘this was a result of coincidence’ (EMI v Papathanasiou 
[1993] at 315; Stone, 1992: 379; Brown, 1987: 246). However, the defence’s 
experience in the courtroom was not as smooth and simple as they had expected. 
Geoffrey Bush had already highlighted the importance of litigation practices in the 
music copyright context (Bush, 1983). Above all, he knew that cross-examination was 
a key moment in which things could go terribly wrong. For someone as experienced 
as him, the inevitable duel between legal and other forms of expertise was 
nevertheless treated as a game, an exercise to be handled with skill, but also with 
humour. He did not have any problem answering tough questions. In contrast, 
Protheroe’s appearance on the witness stand was not so rewarding. It was his first 
appearance in court, so his nerves were understandable. Furthermore, the plaintiffs’ 
counsel, Andrew Morrit QC, challenged Protheroe’s objectivity in the dispute, due to 
his previous musical collaborations and relationship with the defendant (Protheroe, 
1994). Despite (or precisely because of) the fact that he survived the challenge in the 
witness box, and eventually won the case, the uncomfortable experience prompted 
some soul-searching. Although his competence was apparent, and the overall 
experience was gratifying, he was not sure about if, and how, to embark on the 
business of expertise.5  
 
Later that year, the British Academy of Experts was founded. For the legal profession 
this was an unprecedented institutional achievement, since ‘for the first time in 
Britain’ there was ‘a single source of independent experts in a wide range of 
professional, industrial and commercial disciplines’.6 The Academy’s initial aim was 
to create a hub for the gathering of recognised experts across disciplines and to shape 
the standards of expertise. That standardising impetus led to the production of a 
Member’s Handbook and a Model form of Expert’s Report, later described as 
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indispensable tools for those wanting to become experts (Cohen, 1997). The academy, 
in turn, exercised significant influence on the organisation of specialist witnesses in 
Britain. For instance, the Academy capitalised on the need for learning and training 
following the enactment of the Civil Procedure Rules (1999) that followed the Woolf 
Report (1996). Although musicologists had begun to appear as expert witness decades 
earlier (Bellido, 2013), it was through this professional body that Protheroe gained 
confidence and decided to persist as an expert musicologist. The Academy did not 
merely regulate the accreditation of experts, but it also helped people like him, who 
had a connection to the world of expertise (and perhaps had had an unnerving 
experience within that realm), and were curious about the opportunities therein. More 
importantly, the Academy’s institutional framework taught Protheroe about 
administrative and practical issues such as invoicing and contractual arrangements, 
promoting and advertising his services, and securing his professional advice with 
indemnities. The Academy’s influence is evident in the pages of its journal, The 
Expert (Protheroe, 1994). Among the institutional habits and normalizing gestures 
promoted, the journal and the training courses offered by the Academy insisted on 
sharing accounts of experts’ personal experiences. In fact, the Academy assumed a 
guiding and affective role of collectivising embodied knowledge and individual 
experiences by reporting instances in which judges had differentiated between or 
commented upon the role of experts in a given case. In a curious, and revealing, 
coincidence, a few  months after Geoffrey Bush and Guy Protheroe worked together, 
the Academy’s directory began to index the term ‘forensic musicology’ as a 
distinctive field of expertise.  
 
 
Collaboration as Technology   
Becoming an Expert 
 
Over the next decade, Protheroe made his mark as the main expert witness in British 
music copyright (Penfold v Fairbrass [1994]; ZYX Music GmbH v King [1995]; 
Candy Rock Recording Limited v Phonographic Performance Limited [1999]). After 
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Geoffrey Bush’s death in 1998, no other forensic musicologist in London achieved 
the same prestige and professional record. A key feature that distinguished Protheroe 
from Bush was their different relationships with solicitors’ firms. While the latter 
spent a substantial part of his career as an exclusive expert with the same law firm, 
Davenport Lyons, Protheroe worked for almost all the solicitors’ firms in London in 
the niche discipline of copyright. This non-exclusive attitude and the experience 
accumulated enabled him to overcome the difficulties faced in his first courtroom 
appearance. During the 1990s, he provided advice to an average of thirty clients per 
year.  
 
It is thus unsurprising that Charles Russell Solicitors contacted him in January 1999 to 
defend the pop musician Gary Kemp in a copyright and contractual case (Hadley v 
Kemp [1999]). Three members of Kemp’s group, Spandau Ballet, had fallen out over 
the publishing payout with Kemp and subsequently sued him (Southall, 2008: 175; 
Kemp, 2010: 290; Hadley, 2005: 262-271; Kemp, M. 2000: 263). At first glance, the 
controversy seems very different from Protheroe’s first courtroom appearance a 
decade earlier, given it was a dispute over authorship, rather than infringement. 
However, there were some commonalities. For example, one of the most interesting 
pieces of evidence produced by Protheroe in the Vangelis case had concerned the 
ways in which the Greek musician composed music (see EMI v Papathanasiou [1993] 
at 315-317). Although this earlier controversy hinged on Vangelis’ innovative use of 
synthesisers and other electronic accessories, similar analyses unpacking how 
composers actually compose their music had since become standard in music 
copyright cases, for instance in Francis, Day & Hunter v Bron [1963], it was this type 
of advice he was now being asked for in the Spandau Ballet case.  
 
There might be a historical explanation for the similarity of evidential perspectives in 
cases where authorship and infringement are disputed. Since the concepts of the 
author and work are inevitably paired in copyright (Rose, 1994: 23), the processes of 
creation and appropriation become so malleable in practice that they tend to draw 
their vocabulary from the very same discourses of  originality (Sherman and Pottage, 
1997). On the one hand, the creative process of the composer may be examined  in 
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infringement cases so as to identify  musical commonplaces and hence to elucidate 
the work in copyright (Bush, 1983: 133). On the other hand, cases related to the 
distinction between authorship and performance also turn out to the question of the 
copyright work. However, the crucial difference between the contexts is their 
different temporalities, which account for their different visions or interpretations of 
what constitutes the copyright work (Sherman, 2011). Whereas an examination of 
infringement often involves an analysis of the work in the present, the contest over 
authorship tends to view the work retrospectively (Bently, 2009). While these 
temporalities are distinct in the attempt to compare the two works, the question of 
derivation is the evidential threshold that allows the narrative of past events to be 
introduced in copyright infringement cases (Bellido, 2014).  
 
In contrast to the Vangelis case, the Spandau Ballet controversy had a considerable 
impact on copyright doctrine, and thus has been written about extensively (Bently and 
Sherman, 2009; Cornish, Llewelyn and Aplin, 2010). In order to avoid recounting this 
large body of scholarship, I will just focus on a few specific issues frequently 
neglected in those accounts. The most interesting of these is the obstacle that 
Protheroe faced after receiving instructions from the solicitors’ firm. As he recalled in 
a recent interview, he encountered considerable difficulty, since he was not a 
specialist on drumming.7 However, instead of rejecting the client or becoming 
embroiled in a risky and problematic auditory enterprise, he decided to strengthen the 
defence’s case by combining his expertise with that of another expert: a professional 
drummer and percussionist. He initially assumed that the search for a suitable 
candidate would be easy, since, as a freelance musician and conductor, he knew a 
handful of session musicians suitable for the role. However, he needed more than just 
someone who could produce a case-winning report; he had to find a musician 
articulate enough to stand up under cross-examination. Eventually he found Charlie 
Morgan, a prestigious English drummer. Reading the decision by Park J., it appears 
that the overall effect of the defendants’ collective expertise, concurrently deployed, 






Equally interesting, the manner in which both experts presented their expertise shows 
how much the music profession had evolved in just a few years. Instead of analogue 
tapes, they submitted recorded examples on digital audio tapes. While copyright 
scholarship has concentrated on the way that digital technologies have affected the 
subject matter of copyright (Stokes, 2001; Aplin, 2005), a corollary question remains 
unexplored: how these technologies have influenced and informed the way copyright 
evidence has been presented. The case demonstrates the possibilities of digital 
technology within the complex interaction between experts, the evidence they 
harness, and judicial perception. The digital audio tapes allowed for more flexibility, 
fostering a particular way of listening to music, reorganising and indexing tracks, 
making excerpts and playing parts in succession or simultaneously on keyboards or 
other instruments. Whereas the judge in the Vangelis case was able to pause and 
rewind the analogue tapes offered by Protheroe, the judge in the Spandau Ballet case 
could listen directly to the songs already processed on the demo tape. More 
importantly, the digital encoding facilitated the controversial task of qualifying the 
contributions made by the plaintiffs, for instance, the saxophone solo in the Spandau 
Ballet song ‘True’. The defence team succeeded in demonstrating that the particular 
contributions in question were not sufficiently creative in terms of copyright to 
warrant authorship status. Their evidence: statistical analysis, enabled by the digital 
technology, which measured the number of seconds that the specific musical 
instrument, the saxophone, appeared in a given song. The main point here is not the 
overall importance of quantitative proof in the case. Rather, it is to see how 
technology helped quantitative analysis to become qualitative. In other words, it is 
important to notice how the decision by Park J., also adopted this mode of statistical 












Figure  2. Digital Audio Tapes (Spandau Ballet) 
Courtesy of Guy Protheroe 
  
 
Yet it is ironic that recorded examples were used as a proxy for an unrecorded work (a 
song conceived in the composer’s mind). Moreover, following rather unsuccessful 
attempts to refer to the unconscious in copyright infringement cases (Bellido 2013), a 
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puzzling feature of the judge’s decision lay in the appeal to musical consciousness as 
an element for consideration in the proving of music authorship (Hadley v 
Kemp [1999] at 646-649). The judge also seemed to accept that it was possible to hear 
music which had not yet been played. Thus, the reference to musical consciousness 
enabled the defendants’ experts and lawyers to refer their evidence to a moment 
before the music writing process (Osborn and Greenfield, 2006: 313), therefore 
overcoming the procedural and material difficulties posed by the absence of any 
documentary trace in the case. This iteration also reveals the effect of a normative 
understanding of the senses on copyright law (Bellido, 2014). Notation practices and 
their visual components  had often been used as techniques to bring to life the 
moment of writing music, enabling the judge or jury to ‘see’ the copyright work in 
question; here, aural evidence developed a more problematic evidential relationship 
between the record and the deed, indicating how the work could have emerged in the 
past. Privileging the aural over the visual did not only affect copyright litigating 
practices, it also had an impact on the relationship between the idea of a piece of 
music and its embodiment. As one well-known practitioners’ book noted after the 
dispute: ‘In contrast to a literary work, which must be expressed in writing, speech or 
singing before it can exist as a literary work, a musical work may exist as such in the 
mind of its composer as well as when it has been merely played or sung’ (Copinger 
and Skone James on Copyright, 2010: 136). In a similar vein, Mr Justice Richard 
Arnold has noted, extrajudicially, that ‘it is plain that a musical work may exist in a 
composer’s mind before it is written down or otherwise recorded’ (Arnold, 2010: 
155). The possibility of a work being fixed in the musical consciousness of the author 
problematised the conceptual relationship between music and the ‘fixation’ 
requirement in copyright law. In fact, it could be said that different instantiations of 









Contribution to Music  
The work and its embodiment 
 
This complex relationship between the emergence of a copyright work and its musical 
embodiment was seen in another case just a few months later. In February 2000, 
Protheroe was called up by another solicitors’ firm to assess the contribution of a 
session musician, the violinist Robert Beckingham, professionally known as 'Bobby 
Valentino', in a similar controversy over authorship (Southall, 2008: 204-213). He 
was instructed to compare the material played by Valentino with, once again, the 
saxophone solo in Spandau Ballet’s ‘True’, in order to ascertain whether the violin 
material constituted a more extensive contribution to the song than the saxophone solo 
in Hadley v Kemp. Although he pursued an almost identical argument to that of the 
previous case, on this occasion the defence team lost; Valentino was deemed a co-
author of the song. The similarity between the two legal disputes, and the stark 
contrast between their outcomes, makes the cases textbook examples—both for 
lawyers and scholars—of the difficulty in interpreting section 10 of the Copyright, 
Designs and Patent Act (1988). For instance, Zemer (2007: 195) suggested that ‘the 
cases show how arbitrary and subjective the assessment of contribution can be’. 
Similarly, other commentators highlighted this apparent judicial contradiction 
(McQueen et al., 2010: 92-94). Although it can be argued that Valentino’s 
contribution was qualitatively different than the Kemp’s contribution in the Spandau 
Ballet case, it can also be suggested that  the evidential techniques used to present 
Valentino’s claim  affected the outcome. These differences in evidence between the 
cases demonstrate the divergent ways in which the judges viewed the litigated music. 
Before exploring such an evidential gap, there is also another feature that needs to be 
highlighted. While the earlier case of Spandau Ballet involved a dispute over 
authorship between members of a group, Valentino appears to have benefited from his 
distinct background. He was not a member of the group, but rather a freelance 
musician hired by the group for that specific recording (Beckingham v 
Hodgens [2003] at 8). Although no categorical distinction was explicitly established, 
this position already individuated him and aided the perception that his contribution 
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was of a different kind. In other words, it seems that the legal expectations (and not 




On July 2, 2002, Christopher Floyd Q.C. heard the evidence at the Chancery Division 
of the High Court. Undoubtedly the most remarkable appearance in the witness box 
was that of Valentino, who not only gave testimony, but also played a fragment of the 
music before the judge (Southall, 2008: 207). The defendants’ legal team submitted a 
transcription of the music that isolated his contribution visually; arguing that it was 
not of copyright significance. The main evidence employed by the plaintiff to counter 
this argument and therefore to prove his role as an author was a real-time 
performance. Although the law report does not make explicit how the performance 
was taken into account, the impact of the performance was such as to produce a 
different aural experience of the song. The plaintiff apparently believed that there was 
no better way to determine the value of his contribution than to play it in the 
courtroom (Beckingham v Hodgens [2003] at 50). Yet, it is important to consider 
again the troubling irony of this strategic move: a live performance being used as a 
technique or a medium to reconstruct the moment of authorship of a song composed a 
long time ago. Assessing the impact of this iterative technology is highly speculative, 
but its relevance can be identified when we consider the underlying reasoning set out 
in the decision. It is not incidental that the ultimate judgment appears to shift the legal 
focus on the question of collaboration from an appreciation of the composers’ minds 
to their bodies; from the musical consciousness to the bodily gestures made by 
Valentino as he played the musical instruments, as they sought to create something of 










The analysis of aural contours 
 
The contradictions between these two precedents gave rise to a number of other 
copyright conflicts over the next decade. Most of these disputes were settled out of 
court. However, beyond this flurry of controversies, the most significant consequence 
of the contrasting outcomes was a degree of uncertainty generated across the music 
industry as a whole. The confusion and ambiguity meant further work for Protheroe, 
who not only continued to analyse musical contributions, but also started to 
recommend percentages on settlements. Moreover, his parallel activity as a music 
consultant led to his involvement in a wide range of activities, from giving advice 
over the legality of ‘sound-alikes’ of popular songs commissioned by advertising 
agencies, to assessing the possibility of piracy in sound recordings. Despite his 
growing prominence in the field, it is important to consider him as someone curious 
enough to simultaneously engage with and acquire expertise from different sectors of 
the music industry. His ubiquitous and multifaceted presence across institutions made 
him aware of the variety of copyright problems and also gave him insight into the 
array of techniques available for investigating them. In other words, he became more 
of an expert through each successive collaboration, learning more and more in the 
process. His membership in and recognition by the Musician’s Union was crucial for 
him to mediate the authorship controversies that emerged in the post-Valentino era, 
but similarly, his long-standing link with the International Federation of Phonographic 
Industry (IFPI) enabled him to explore different ways of detecting piracy in sound 
recordings.8 In doing so, he collaborated with sound engineers in order to develop 
forensic methods for comparing recordings.9  
 
The first method was direct aural comparison, which paid attention to the 
aural contours of the recordings themselves. Listening carefully to two recordings of 
the same song, it was possible to determine aural similarities in sound quality or 
performance style in order to identify unique extraneous events and to distinguish 
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bootlegs and other forms of piracy. The second investigative method, synchronisation, 
was undoubtedly more complicated but potentially more valuable; listening to the two 
recordings simultaneously enabled him to hear the phasing effects, and the variations 
between performances. As a result of this experimentation, he appeared as an expert 
in music cases that involved the use of digital recording tools such as Cubase 
(Taylor v Rive Droite Music [2004]). Although this mode of machine-based sensing 
appeared, at first glance, to break from the type of expertise he was used to, in fact it 
did not. His curiosity and capacity to learn from different contacts had been and 
continued to be one of the factors that enabled him to accumulate expertise from 
experience. In fact, the insistence of solicitors firms on repeatedly using the same 
experts, such as Protheroe, in music copyright litigation converted them into the 
medium through which the inherent instability of a copyright controversy became 
momentarily stabilised. Forensic musicologists and the practices they developed 
operated as contingent stabilising factors in the uncertain event of a copyright dispute 
both within and outside the courtroom.  
 
Sound and Vision   
 
As Protheroe steadily concatenated cases and opinions, his authority increased 
accordingly. Perhaps the most salient indication of his expanding prestige was his 
appointment in a 2004 music copyright infringement case as the single joint expert by 
both parties (Malmstedt v EMI [2004]). Nevertheless, the prototypical scenario in 
which he continued to assist clients was always conditioned by an adversarial context. 
If the battle between experts is the rule in music copyright trials, it is worth 
considering the other experts that Protheroe worked against. Of all the expert 
witnesses he confronted, Peter Oxendale was his most frequent adversary. According 
to Protheroe’s estimation, he and Oxendale dealt with almost ninety percent of the 
controversies in music copyright in Britain in the last three decades. The frequency by 
which Oxendale and Protheroe were hired shows how much lawyers liked the stability 
that came with knowing the experts. Oxendale was another member of the British 
Academy of Experts who, after a career as a popular keyboard player, had become an 
expert witness and consultant in music disputes (Taylor v Rive Droite Music Ltd 
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[2004]; Locksley Brown v MCASSO Music Productions [2005]; Fisher v Brooker 
[2006]). However, Protheroe’s most distinctive and challenging adversary was 
undoubtedly the music historian and musicologist Stanley Sadie (1930-2005). Sadie 
had been a music critic for The Times (1964–1981) but his major contribution to 
music scholarship was his work as editor of major reference encyclopaedias such as 
the New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians (1980; 2001) and the New Grove 
Dictionary of Musical Instruments (1984). Although Sadie had previously been 
peripherally interested in the subject of copyright, reviewing the tenth edition of 
Copinger (Sadie, 1966), he never considered developing a professional career as an 
expert witness. He ultimately only appeared twice as an expert witness and in both 
cases Protheroe was the expert musicologist on the other side.  
 
In January 2001, he met Protheroe during a dispute regarding the attribution of the 
music from  a James Bond film (Norman v Times Newspapers Limited [2001]). A few 
years earlier, The Sunday Times had insinuated that Monty Norman was not the author 
of the musical theme in question (Fiegel, 2001; Burlingame, 2012). Norman decided 
to sue the newspaper on the grounds of copyright infringement and libel. Although the 
possibility of these  two claims was an interesting reflection on the (then) new 
statutory protection of moral rights in British copyright law, the most distinctive 
aspect of the case was its procedure. This trial, with the outcome decided by a jury 
rather than by a single judge, shaped the experts’ struggle when explaining music in 
the courtroom. Both experts had been explicitly advised by counsel to scale down 
their analyses into a concise description that would be comprehensible to  the lay 
listener. As the hearing evolved, problems emerged when different musical scores 
were submitted by each side. Would jury members (or the judge) be able to read or 
understand them? Not only was the music notated differently, some parts of these 
scores were said to be not ‘singable’ at all. Despite the fact that both legal teams tried 
to bridge these differences by singing the songs, playing the music, projecting the film 
and submitting musical examples – now via compact discs – the legal strategy of both 
sides embraced the idea that an ordinary listener ought to be able to detect the 
distinction between authorship and performance. While it is problematic to suggest 
that the ordinary listener is the key judge of the nature and extent of authorship – 
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since that standard is not currently established in British copyright law – the explicit 
formulation in the James Bond case reveals an aspect often obscured in music 
copyright litigation: the objective is not only the need to distinguish whether music is 
a matter for the ear or the eye, but to distinguish whose ear (or eye) is constructed in 





Figure 3. Compact Disc (Monty Norman v The Sunday Times) 
Courtesy of Julie Anne Sadie 
 
 
As performances and musical techniques made it possible to listen to music in the 
courtroom, it seems that the visual comparison of songs was losing some of its 
demonstrative and persuasive capacity. This view will certainly convince those who 
believe that the law mirrors reality. If the relationship between the composer and the 
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arranger in popular music is no longer primarily mediated by scores (or at least not as 
frequently), examining them as evidence would now be a lost cause. The shift from 
visual to aural could explain why the majority of British music copyright cases in the 
last three decades, both in the framework of authorship and copyright infringement 
actions, have been fascinated with different modes of listening as the main vehicle to 
experience music. However, the appeal to vision as a way of making inferences, and 
demonstrating similarities and differences between works or between works and 
performances, has never disappeared from judicial assessment. Even in typical 
disputes over authorship of popular music, the transcription of music was, as 
discussed, frequently linked with attempts to connect the music to the moment that the 
law tries to reconstruct (EMI v Papathanasiou [1993] at 309). In these processes of 
musical and legal imagination, musical examples, notations, performances and 
illustrations are produced in the courtroom by experts and lawyers, not only with the 
purpose of listening to (or viewing) the music, but also to reveal how the scene of 
collaboration or the act of copying might have left a mark on the music played. In 
fact, it is exactly the historicity, time, and subjectivity evidenced in the reproduction 
or the performance of the songs, which facilitates an explanation of the ways that 
music is composed by composers. 
 
 
In early 2004, Stanley Sadie and Guy Protheroe met again as expert witnesses, now to 
assess a different kind of complexity between the aural and the visual dimensions in 
which music evolves. Lionel Sawkins had sued Hyperion Records Limited for 
copyright infringement, claiming that the recording company had copied his editions 
of four musical works by Lalande (1657-1726). While the case revisited, in the 
framework of classical music, longstanding problems in popular music, it is 
interesting to observe how the case was and has been perceived differently by 
lawyers, expert musicologists and lay people. What has made this case so attractive 
for copyright scholars is that it allows for clear-cut distinctions and classifications 
(Rahmatian, 2009; Pila, 2010: 235), a rarity in copyright cases. For lay people, the 
controversy reflected the possibility of recognising the existence of copyright in a 
work comprising non-copyright material. For musicologists, the case was 
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simultaneously interesting and complicated in its potential consequences for the 
profession. It was the first time that a musicologist had brought a copyright claim 
based on his work. Precisely because of that, Stanley Sadie’s assistance was 
considered crucial. Sadie was well known as a music historian and writer, particularly 
as a Mozart and Handel expert (Sadie, 1972; 1996; 2006); but he had also been the 
president of the International Musicological Society (Kozinn: 2005).  
 
 
Significantly, he had also prepared performing editions of works by Lalande and 
some of his French contemporaries for the BBC (Sadie et al. 2005: 219-237). In April 
2004, a week before the court hearing, solicitors and counsel representing the plaintiff 
travelled by train to Sadie’s Somerset home in order to discuss their final strategy.10 
Curiously, this time the controversy did not focus on the transposition of music as a 
means to prove its originality, but on assessing the task of transcribing music in order 
to imagine how a musical work might have been created. In other words, the judge’s 
task was to assess the creativity of the system of notation developed by the claimant, 
in order to consider the originality of his music. Mr Justice Patten ruled in favour of 
Sawkins on July 2, 2004. One of the key documents submitted by his legal team had 
been a set of elaborate charts in which the judge could see the different editorial 
interventions made by Sawkins to produce a practical performing score. Again, we 
can observe here the resilience of the visual, not in representing the sound or nature of 
the music, but as a means to reveal the creative process at work and therefore to 











Figure 4. Tables (Sawkins v Hyperion Records) 
Courtesy of Julie Anne Sadie 
 
Music Expertise in Copyright  
 
Although scholars have recently emphasised the important role played by experts in 
music copyright disputes (Bently 2009; Cason and Müllensiefen: 2012; Bellido 2013), 
key questions remain: what specific techniques have the experts used, and what has 
their impact been in the development of the law? One way to answer these questions 
is to follow the controversies in order to consider the ways in which the musical work 
is constructed in the courtroom. Rather than drawing on an a priori perspective, the 
historical perspective enables us to see how expertise might be indeed transmitted and 
learned from one expert to another and how teams of experts and lawyers have 
worked together through copyright issues involved in different trials. While this 
perspective shows the ways knowledge is generated in practice, it also reveals how 
collaborative and contingent expertise turns out to be. On the one hand, experts and 
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lawyers render the intangible work intelligible through particular visual, aural and 
argumentative techniques. On the other hand, their combined role is also relevant in 
preparing arguments and evidence for one of the most ubiquitous debates in recent 
music copyright scholarship: the legal distinction between authorship and 
performance (Arnold, 1999).  
 
The historical analyses not only point to the complex linkages between musicological 
and legal expertise, they also reveal the ways technology has mediated and constituted 
their relation. The switch between audio-visual material, performances and different 
recording formats, and their various uses as evidential clues, had an impact on the 
way that musical judgments were reached. In this sense, the different aural and visual 
registers elicited in trials were entangled in such convoluted ways that they produced 
evidential gaps. Aural and visual registers were channelled through different 
instruments and technologies in order to allow the judge (or the jury) to listen and to 
see the music under litigation. Each technology resulted in its own relationship 
between sensory perception and knowledge production; or, to put it differently, each 
of these technologies simultaneously enabled and constrained—each in its own 
slightly different way—the ability of the judge and the jury to understand and 
adjudicate the case. Three decades ago, for example, cassette tapes were an innovative 
means to guide judges as they listened to the evidence; in more recent years, 
performances and digital technologies have become instrumental to indexing and 
visually presenting songs to judges, enabling them to see whether an artist contributed 
to the composition of a song or whether the work was a copyright infringement. The 
possibility of experiencing music differently in the courtroom and beyond has also 
created contradicting results in some cases and a subsequent struggle to make sense of 
them. In all these ways, the combination of law and practice has affected the evolution 
of copyright theory, not only the abstract distinction drawn between authors and 
performers, but also the special characteristics attributed to musical works. Forensic 
musicologists’ recurrent strategy of tracking the emergence of a musical work back to 
the consciousness of the composer is one of the features that made music copyright 








While the combination of legal and musicological expertise could have facilitated the 
development of doctrine and legal categories, it is more interesting to highlight the 
ubiquitous presence of a particular group of musical experts. Their pervasive 
appearance in different trials shows a more subtle and yet important role. These 
particular experts and their techniques have served as points of stabilisation in the 
conceptual tensions embedded in copyright disputes. Precisely because their 
continuous involvement in a stream of cases elucidated different conceptual and 
analytical issues, it is vital to consider the controversies as they evolved in order to 
appreciate how different technologies have governed the sensory experience in British 
courts over the last three decades. As the practices of both lawyers and music experts 
have been mediated by different technologies, the question of how they will impact 
future disputes is as murky as the question of how future technologies will shape 
music—and authorship, and performance—itself. Tracing the past encounters 
between specific experts and legal practices and linking them to their particular legal 
settings, however, helps us to better understand music copyright as a dynamic entity 
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